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STATE POLICE LEGISLATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court of the United States has again, we venture
respectfully to believe, misinterpreted its constitutional function in
passing upon the validity of state legislation under the police power




The Nebraska standard-weight bread law provided for the manufac-
ture and sale of a few standard-size loaves only, in multiples of pounds
and half-pounds. The avowed purpose of the statute was to protect
buyers from short weights and bakers from unfair competition. To
effectuate the purpose, it prohibited under penalty variations from the
standard beyond a tolerance of two ounces per pound above or below,
but required the specified weight to be ascertained by an average taken
from 25 loaves in a unit. The alleged unreasonableness, for which
the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional, lay in the prohibition
against baking and selling loaves which exceed the prescribed weight
by more than the two ounce tolerance. The Court held that the pro-
vision was "not necessary for the protection of purchasers against
imposition and fraud by short weights," was "not calculated to effectu-
ate that purpose," and that it "subjected bakers and sellers of bread
to restrictions which are essentially unreasonable and arbitrary." The
last ground, which apparently constituted the principal basis for the
alleged violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, was derived mainly from the fact that in various seasons certain
precautions, such as wrapping, would frequently become neces-
sary to retard undue evaporation and that customers generally pre-
ferred unwrapped bread, which would thus often be difficult, owing
to atmospheric conditions, to supply.
In the Schmidinger case2 the Court had settled that the sale of bread
was a proper subject of police power regulation, and that to prevent
short weights, the fixing of standard sizes and weights is an appro-
priate means. The loaf in the Chicago ordinance then under considera-
tion had to bear a label stating its weight. The Nebraska statute
here in question was in some respects milder in its requirements than
the Chicago ordinance-it provided for a tolerance of two ounces in
the pound, tested by averages of 25 loaves; the prescribed weight
applied for only twenty-four hours after baking; the weighing was
to be done on the baker's premises; and no label was required. The
size was to constitute the evidence of weight. But the Nebraska
statute was more stringent than the Chicago ordinance in prohibiting
an excess-weight loaf, beyond the prescribed standard, including toler-
ance, and this, as already observed, was held to constitute the vulner-
ability of the Act.
The distinguishing characteristic between the majority opinion of
the Court (by Butler, J.) and the minority (Brandeis and Holmes,
JJ.) lies in the absence, in the majority opinion, of any extended
discussion of the facts of scientific experience in the making and dis-
tribution of bread, and in the almost exclusive devotion of the minority
opinion of justice Brandeis to an exhaustive discussion of the scientific
investigations of the federal and state governments and of experts.
'Schmidinger v. Chicago (913) 226 U. S. 578, 33 Sup. Ct. 182.
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These seem to show that expert opinion, beginning with the regula-
tions of the federal Food Administration during the War, had come
to the nearly unanimous conclusion, adopted in the legislation of
some twelve states, but contrary to the views of the majority of the
Court, that the prohibition of excess weights was deemed necessary
and appropriate to effectuate the purpose of preventing short weights
(in the next higher standard size) and unfair practices, and that it
was a practicable method of preventing evasions without imposing
unreasonable burdens.
Admitting that on these questions of fact there may be a difference
of opinion, the important issue arises as to the function of the Supreme
Court in the legislative and constitutional process. It is not necessary
even to agree with the preponderant conclusion of the experts in order
to believe that the Supreme Court made an error in substituting its
own judgment as to policy or reasonableness or appropriateness of,
means to end for that of the legislature, sustained by the state court."
The true field of judicial inquiry under the fourteenth amendment
would seem to be confined to determining whether the legislature had
sufficient facts before them upon which, as reasonable men, they
might justifiably have reached the conclusion adopted that the means
devised were calculated reasonably to effect the object desired. To
determine this, it is not always possible to examine the evidence before
the legislature; but where country-wide experiments have been made
over a period of years it is not unreasonable to suggest that th Supreme
Court might have taken judicial notice of the fact that a preponderant
expert opinion had concluded that the excess-weight prohibition.
with tolerances, was necessary, reasonable, and appropriate to its pur-
pose without undue burden on the baker, and that the legislature was
familiar with these conclusions. Even if the expert opinion had not
been preponderant, it could not be said that the legislature did not have
adequate ground to believe that the means were necessary and effective.
That suffices to sustain legislation under the police power and, it is
believed, exhausts the revisory function of the federal judiciary under
the fourteenth amendment. It is arbitrariness that is to be controlled,
not opinion based on evidence, even if conflicting. For the Court to
go further, and to determine for itself, legislative grounds for belief
being admitted, what it considers appropriate or inappropriate, desira-
ble or undesirable, reasonable or unreasonable, is, it is respectfully
submitted, to misconceive its constitutional function. Incidentally.
it may be said, that ex-Justice Clarke's suggestion that the concurrence
of two justices in sustaining a statute should be regarded by the
majority as evidencing that reasonable doubt which should bar a
statute from being held unconstitutional, was applicable in this case.
E. M. B.
'Jay Buts Baking Co. v. Bryan (1922) io8 Neb. 674, I89 N. W. 383.
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THE OPINIONS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION
IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Mixed Claims Commissions are a familiar variety of international
tribunal, some of whose decisions in the past have constituted valuable
contributions to international law." But when created by a treaty of
peace imposed by a victor on a vanquished foe, their value as precedent-
makers is likely to be diminished. The Treaty of Berlin 2 having
reserved all American rights and claims as previously stipulated in a
Joint Resolution of Congress3 and in certain sections of the Treaty of
Versailles,4 an agreement for a Mixed Claims Commission to determine
the validity of these claims was confirmed by the Act of August io,
I922.' The Commission is composed of one American and one German
Commissioner and an umpire selected by agreement.6 The fact that
Germany is given this amount of representation suggests an arbitration
rather than the fixing of a war indemnity ;7 but the Commission must
follow the treaty, an arbitrary expression of the will of one of the
parties, and is not free to follow the general rules of international law.'
The claims of a victorious belligerent are not limited by international
law,9 but a growing custom which recently crystallized in the IVth
Hague Convention 0 imposes a minimum liability whereby all bellig-
The number and importance of such commissions will be seen by reference
to Moore, Digest of International Arbitrations (1898); Borchard, Diplomatic
Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) ; Ralston, International Arbitral Law and
Procedure (igio).
'August 25, 1921 (42 Stat. at L. 1939).
'Commonly called the "Knox-Porter Resolution," Act of July 2, 1921 (42 Stat.
at L. io5).
'The Treaty of Berlin gave the United States the privilege of availing itself
of any of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles included in Part IV, Section i,
and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, XV.
542 Stat. at L. 2200.
'Germany agreed to an American Umpire, Mr. Justice Day of the Supreme
Court being chosen. Upon his resignation because of illness, the American Com-
missioner, judge Edwin B. Parker, was made Umpire.\
"A bill which provided for an ex parte Commission of Americans was defeated
in the Senate. The debates on this question and some of the documents printed
in the Record are of considerable interest. See 62 Cong. Rec. (Sept 21, 1922)
Sixth-seventh Congress, 14073-14093.
'"The Treaty is our charter," said the Commission in its Opinions, at p. 31.
(The opinions of the Commission are consecutively paged and are hereinafter
cited as "Op. Com. p. . . ."). In Op. Com. at p. 76, the Commission said: "The
terms of the Treaty fix and limit Germany's obligation to pay, and the Com-
mission is not concerned with enquiring whether the act for which she has
accepted responsibility was legal or illegal as measured by rules of international
law. It is probable that a large percentage of the financial obligations imposed
.... would not arise under the rules of international law but are terms imposed
by the victor as one of the conditions of peace."
22 Fauchille, Traiti de Droit International (1g2i) 3o9.
"0I Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences (192o) 621; Bor-
chard, op. cit. supra note I, at p. 248.
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erents are liable for certain unlawful acts causing damage to an indi-
vidual whether enemy or neutral."' As a matter of fact, however,
neutral claims rest on a surer basis than those of a belligerent, since
the victor's liability may be discharged by a clause in the peace treaty.'2
The claims of neutrals, on the other hand, are based also on customary
international law which allows them a like recovery for damage caused
by unlawful acts of war 3 but not for injuries inflicted by lawful mili-
tary acts such as bombardments of fortified cities, sieges, destruction
based on military or strategic reasons, or in general all lawful acts
occurring in the path of war.'4 Before the Mixed Claims Commission
the United States presents claims both as a neutral and as a successful
belligerent. The liability imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of
Berlin as interpreted by the Commission in Administrative Decision
No. I,'- is in part based on the rules of law noted above and in part on
the fact that Germany was defeated in the war. Germany must pay
for all damage to American property wherever situated, of which the
proximate cause was the lawful or unlawful acts -of Germany or her
agents in the prosecution of the war during the period of American
neutrality, whether the claimant suffered directly as an individual or
indirectly as a stockholder.' No such sweeping liability is imposed by
international law. During the period of American belligerency
Germany's liability is also in excess of the minimum provided by the
Hague Convention. Since a maximum is not fixed by international
law, no penalty can be described as "legal" or "illegal," but it is
nevertheless interesting to note the number of categories of damage due
to illegal acts.' 7 Under this head may be placed damages for maltreat-
'At the Conference Germany advocated a special duty to neutrals but was
voted doivn. 3 Scott, op. cit. supra note IO, at pp. 8o, 139; see 2 Oppenheim,
Interuztional Law (3d ed. 1921) 353.
"See, for example, Treaty of Versailles, Art. 244, Annex III, sec. 8, and Art.
298, Annex, sec. 2. The. older view is expressed in Ware v. Hylton; (1796, U. S.)
3 Dall. i99, 23o, where it is said that if the treaty is silent, the claim is dead.
" See 6 Moore, Digest of International Law (19o6) sec. 1037; Borchard, op. cit.
supra note i, at p. 256; Fauchille, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 797.
" Borchard, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 256; Fauchille, op. cit. supra note 9, at
p. 3o2; Moore, op. cit. supra note I3, sec. 1032; Ralston, op. cit. supra note i, at
p. 277. The Dutch Government admitted this during the World War. Dutch
Orange Book (1916) 146.
"Nov. I, 1923, Op. Com. p. I.
"Op. Com. p. 2. The broad meaning which the American counsel wished to
attach to the word "indirectly" was rejected. Ibid. iI.
' The Commission adopts the categories laid down in Annex I, Art. 244, Part
VIII of the Treaty of Versailles with the exception of Nos. 5, 6, 7, .covering
pensions, care of prisoners, and dependents' allowances. An historical survey
of the peace treaties of the past century indicates that the Treaty of Versailles,
incorporated by reference in the Treaty of Berlin, is almost unique in its exact
specification of the bases of liability. A usual provision has been for the pay-
ment of a fixed sum to defray the expenses of the war or merely as a war
indemnity. See Art. VII of Treaty of Frankfort (France and Germany) May
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ment of prisoners of war,' and for acts of cruelty to, or maltreatment
of, civilians;1" as well as damages to civilians for all acts injurious to
health, capacity to work, or honor,
2 0 or for being forced to labor without
just remuneration.21 On the other hand, defeat alone is the basis for
Germany's liability for damages to all property (with the exception of
naval and military works or materials) wherever situated, or however
injured by Germany or her allies; and for damages to property caused
by "any belligerent" in consequence of hostilities or of any operations
of war (with the same exception) ; and also for damages to persons
arising from acts of war, including bombardments or other attacks and
all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war. The
damage to persons includes that suffered by surviving 
dependents.
2 2
The exception of "naval and military works or materials" has
presented an interesting problem, a solution of which is offered by the
Commission's Opinion of March 25.
23 The term "has no technical
signification."'24 It is a new phrase whose meaning is not illumined by
precedent. The Commission decided
' that the treaties were primarily
concerned with compensation for damages suffered by the civilian popu-
1o, 1871, 62 British and Foreign State Papers 77 (hereafter cited as B. & F. State
Papers) ; Art. XI of Treaty of Prague (Austria and Prussia) Aug. 23, 1866,
56 ibid. io5o; Art. VI of Treaty of Nanking (England and China) Aug. 29,
1842, 30 ibid. 389; Art. IV of Treaty of Paris (France and the Allies) Nov. 20,
1815, II Martens, Nouveau Receui des Traits (i818) 688. In some treaties
claims have been renounced on both sides but in these cases there has usually
been a territorial readjustment. See Art. VII of Treaty of Paris (United States
and Spain) Dec. io, i898, 2 Malloy, Treaties Between the United States and
Other Powers (igio) x692; Art. XIV of Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (United
States and Mexico) Feb. 2, 1848, 1 ibid. 1114; cf. Arts. XVIII-XIX of Treaty
of Paris (France and the Allies) May 30, 1814, I B. & F. State Papers 151.
On some occasions it has been stipulated that property sequestered or taken as
prize but not yet condemned, shall be returned. See Art. III of Treaty of Zurich
(France and Austria) Nov. 1o, i859, 49 B. & F. State Papers, 364; Art. XI of
Treaty of Kiel (England and Denmark) Jan. i4, 1814, i ibid. 234. Cf. Art.
XIII of Treaty of Vienna (Austria. Prussia and Denmark) Oct. 30, 1864, 54 ibid.
522. The famous Jay treaty of 1794, Art. VII, i Malloy, 596, provided for a
commission to determine sums due to merchants or others for illegal captures
and condemnations. In the treaty of San Stefano of 1878 (Russia and Turkey)
69 B. & F. State Papers, 732, there is a more or less detailed account stated of
the damage for which Turkey agrees to pay. The Treaty of Bucharest of May 7.
i9i8, io Martens, (1920) 3d series, 856, which Germany imposed upon Rumania.
suggests the final peace treaties, though Rumania's liability is not quite so detailed.
" Forbidden by the IVth Hague Convention, Annex Art. 4, 1 Scott, op. cit. supra
note io, at p. 623.
"Art. 46. Ibid. 63o.
"Ibid.
Art. 52. Ibid.





lation and that no liability was imposed on Germany for "property
impressed with a military character either by reason of its inherent
nature or by the use to which it was devoted at the time of the loss."-"
With respect to ships (the only class of property covered by the above
opinion) the test as laid down is whether they were operated privately
for private gain or by the United States "directly in furtherance of a
military operation.12 7  The Commission admitted that in a broad sense
the whole merchant marine was mobilized for war, but seemed to reason
that the line must be drawn somewhere and that the above test provided
a reasonable place at which to draw it. Perhaps such a solution is
reasonable; it seems preferable to the view of the Reparation Commis-
sion which makes ownership and offensive operations the test.2 But it
is believed that had the Commission felt free to follow the rules of inter-
national law, they might well have included vessels which under inter-
national law were stripped of their peaceful character. Such. for
example would be belligerently convoyed ships 29 and armed merchantmen,
which though privileged to arm, yet by exercising the privilege forfeited
their immunity as peaceful merchantmen. 30 Such vessels were treated
by the Navy Department as part of the fighting force directed against
the submarine. 31  The Commission rejected the contention of the
German Agent that the control of vessels by the Shipping Board created
a presumption that they were used in furtherance of the military effort
of the United States.3 2
In Administrative Decision No. II,33 the Commission looks largely
to legal precedents 34 to find "basic principles" for "the preparation,
presentation, and decision of all cases submitted." While pointing
out3 5 that "the source of, and limitations upon, the Commission's
powers and jurisdiction" are the agreement of August io, 1922, the
Commission will look to international law when the Treaty is silent.
Thus from international law is derived the necessity for settling the
preliminary point of jurisdiction; the rules to be applied in determining
the measure of damages ;31 the fact that the Government and not its
'Ibid. 78.
'7Ibid. 79, 80.
See 5 Report on the Work of the Reparations Commission (1923) 49.
See The Atlanta (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 409, 423; Hyde, International Law
(1922) 459; Britain S. S. Co. v. King [1919] i K. B. 575, 58o.
See (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 439.
'See Report of the Secretary of the Navy (1917) 3, 7; ibid. (1918) 30.
'Op. Com. p. 84.
Nov. 1, 1923, Op. Com. p. 5.
', The footnotes of this decision are abundant evidence of the fact stated.
Op. Com. p. 5.
'In relation to this point the Commission lists (at p. 7) the kinds of law to
which it will look as follows: (a) international conventions, whether general
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the United States and
Germany; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law; (c) rules of law common to the United States and Germany established
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citizens is the real party; the requirement that all claims shall be
American owned; the determination of the person in whom a cause of
action originally vests and questions of transfer of interest.
3 7
In the opinions already handed down there is much that will be of
interest in the field of municipal as well as of international law.
88 It is
by either statutes or judicial decisions; (d) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; (e) judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of all nations, as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law; but (f) the Commission will not be bound by any
particular code or rules of law but shall be guided by justice, equity, and good
faith.
" Only three of the seven decisions already handed down by the Commission
have been dealt with in the text. The other decisions are of more interest in the
field of national law. In the Opinion in the Litsitania Cases, Nov. i, x923, Op.
Com. p. 17, the Commission rejects the principle of punitive or exemplary dam-
ages because it believes the proper theory of damages is the compensation of an
injured party and not the punishment of the wrongdoer, and also because no
international arbitral tribunal has awarded such damages and the Treaty of
Berlin does not provide for them. In the opinion of the same date, Op. Com.
p. 33, the war risk insurance premium claims were all ruled out on the ground
that they represented losses for which the acts of Germany were not the proxi-
mate cause. Administrative Decision No. III, Dec. 1I, 1923, Op. Com. 6i, deals
with the measure of damages for property losses which is stated to be "the
reasonable market value of the property as of the time and place of taking in the
condition in which it then was"; if there was no market value, then the intrinsic
value as 6f such time and place. The question of interest is also fully covered
in this opinion. On March II, 1924, Op. Com. p. 71, the Commission rejected
a further war risk insurance premium claim which was urged upon them as an
exception to the class covered by the previous opinion.
By Art. I, par. 3 of the'Claims Agreement, the Commission also has jurisdic-
tion of "debts owing to American citizens by the German Government or by
German nationals." This is an extraordinary clause in an arbitration agreement
and was doubtless inspired by Art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles providing for
clearing house proceedings for debts. This provision was rejected by the United
States. But under that article reciprocity to German and English creditors is
assured whereas the Treaty of Berlin benefits only American creditors. The
important question raised by the "debts" clause is that of "valorization" of the
mark. Is the German Government liable to pay the debts of German debtors
at the March i917 rate of the mark? Does the sequestration of debts in Germany
constitute an "exceptional war measure" under Art. 297 creating such liability?
Under the Treaty of Berlin it may be difficult to find a provision valorizing
private debts. Inasmuch as the German Government so contended, both as to
the Government and as to the private debtor, and since there is evidence that the
American negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles believed the private creditor
and the private debtor to remain unaffected, in the absence of the clearing house
provision, a supplementary agreement was concluded between the two Agencies
on May 15, 1923, empowering the Commission to determine to what extent and
at what rate the German Government and the private debtor are respectively
liable for private debts. No case has yet been argued or decided on these points.
' See Yntema, The Treaties se'th Germany and Compensation for 'War Damage
(1923) 23 CoI. L. R-Ev. 5ii; (924) 24 ibid. I34; NoTEs (1924) 37 HAav. L. Rr-v.
492; Fehr, American Claims against Germany (1924) 219 No'rHT AmEmRcAN
REviEw, 8.
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to be hoped that the Commission in the future will feel more free to
follow legal international precedents so that its opinions may in turn
serve as precedents for the future. It may be said that the United
States, which in the past has contributed so much to the international law
of arbitration, has set a further good example in settling these war
claims at least in part upon the basis of law.
ADHERENCE TO STATE DECISIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS
Diversity of citizenship was made a ground of federal jurisdiction"
in Sec. ii of the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 to afford non-residents a
tribunal free from local prejudice.2 It seems a natural inference that the
federal tribunals would apply the common law of the state rather than
a distinct system, and section 34 provides that "the laws of the several
states . . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases -where they apply."3
Recent research by Charles Warren in the history of the passage of
the act reveals quite conclusively that "laws" was used in the broad
sense inclusive of the unwritten law.4 In the first cases in which Sec.
34 made its debut in the courts, it was thought that "laws" embraced
the common law.5  Nevertheless in 1842, in Swift v. Tyson, 6 Justice
Story construed "laws" as limited "to state laws strictly local, that is
to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having
a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and
other matters immovable and intraterritorial . . . . and does not extend
to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true
interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions
of the local tribunals but in the general principles of commercial
jurisprudence."
'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. ii (I Stat. at L. 78).
'Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Deveaux (18og, U. S.) 5 Cranch, 6r,
87; Justice Pitney dissenting in Lankford v. Platte Iron Works (915) 235 U. S.
461, 478, 35 Sup. Ct. 173, 177; Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions
of State Law (i91) 45 AmszR. L. REv. 47, 50.
'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 34 (1 Stat. at L. 92).
'The original draft of sec. 34 found by him in the Archives of Congress pro-
vided that "(the statute law) of the several states (in force for the time being and
their unwritten or common law now in use whether by adoption from the common
law of England, the ancient Statutes of the same or otherwise) . . . ." The
words in parentheses were stricken out and "laws" inserted with a caret before
the words "of the several states." Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, at p. 86.
See Brown v. Van Braam (1797, U. S.) 3 Dall. 344, 352; Sims v. Irvine (1799,
U. S.) 3 Dall. 425, 454.
8 (1842, U. S.) 16 Pet. 1 (indorsee taking negotiable paper for a pre-existing
debt held to be a holder in due course).
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The cases in elaboration of the doctrine are legion.7 The construc-
tion of a state constitution8 or statute9 by the state court of last resort 0
is in general conclusive upon the federal courts. This is true also of
what are said to be "local laws"" and "rules of property,"'1 though
the cases are not in harmony as to the content of these generalities.'3
Illustrative of the former are the rules of evidence,' 4 the question of
municipal liability for injuries caused by defects in sidewalks,' 5 whether
the contractual or the statutory rate of interest is to be applied after
maturity,16 the -rule denying recovery against a carrier for injuries
received while traveling on Sunday,' 7 and interpretations of the Statute
of Frauds even on questions common to all statutes ;"' illustrative of the
latter are laws concerning the construction of deeds and wills,19 adverse
possession, -° fraudulent conveyances, 2' the validity of mortgages, 22 and
the rights of riparian owners.2 3 On the other hand the federal courts
The cases are collected in 3 U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. (1916) 2981; 5 Fed. Sts.
Ann. (2-d ed. 1916) 1123; 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 380, note.
'See Luther v. Borden (1849, U. S.) 7 How. I, 4o.
'Douglas v. Noble (1923) 261 U . 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 303; McCutchen v. Union
Trust Co. (1921, C. C. A. 8th) 271 Fed. 586. Otherwise if the decision proceeds
upon general principles rather than upon the particular language of the statute.
Venice v. Murdock (875) 92 U. S. 494.
" But not the decisions of a lower state court. In re F. & D. Co. (1929,
C. C. A. 2d) 256 Fed. 73; compare Erie R. R. v. Hilt (1918) 247 U. S. 97, 38 Sup.
Ct. 435. Or the dicta of the highest court. In re Sullivan (i9o6, C. C. A. 8th)
148 Fed. 8x5. At least unless often reiterated. Gibson Coal Co. v. Allen (f922,
C. C. A. 6th) 28o Fed. 28. If the state decisions are inconsistent, the latest will
be followed. Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining and Tunnel Co.
(1921, C. C. A. 8th) 271 Fed. 157. Not, however, if such decisions overrule earlier
decisions in force when the rights of the parties accrued. See Burgess v, Seligman
(1883) l07 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 20. Or even if there were no state decisions at
that time. Julian v. Central Trust Co. (1904) 193 U. S. 93, 24 Sup. Ct. 399.
"Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. (1888) 125 U. S. 555, 582, 8 Sup. Ct. 974, 978.
1 See Converse v. Mears (19o8, C. C. W. D. Wis.) 162 Fed. 767, 771.
See Baltimore R. R. v. Baugh (1893) 149 U. S. 368, 371, 13 Sup. Ct. 914, 916;
Detroit v. Osborne (i8go) 135 U. S. 492, IO Sup. Ct. 1012.
"Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Land Co. (19o3) 189 U. S. 221, 23
Sup. Ct. 517; compare Chicago Ry. v. Kendall (19o9, C. C. A. 8th) 167 Fed. 62.
"Detroit v. Osborne (289o) 135 U. S. 492, 10 Sup. Ct. 1012.
" Ohio v. Frank (188o) 103 U. S. 697.
' Bucher v. Cheshire R. R., supra note II.
"'Beckwith v. Clark (1911, C. C.-A. 8th) 288 Fed. 171.
"Buford v. Kerr (1898, C. C. A. 8th) 9o Fed. 513; but see Foxcraft v. Mallett
(1846, U. S.) 4 How. 353; compare Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. (1910) 215 U. S.
349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140, which apparently requires in addition that the cases be so
numerous as to establish a rule of conduct.
"Scott v. Mineral Development Co. (29o4, C. C. A. 6th) 13o Fed. 497; certiorari
denied (195o) 196 U. S. 640, 25 Sup. Ct. 796.
"Dooley v. Pease (19Ol) i8o U. S. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. 329.
' Wilson v. Perrin (1894, C. C. A. 6th) 62 Fed. 629; see Etheridge v. Sperry
(1891)139 U. S. 266, 11 Sup. Ct. 565.
'St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. Board of Water Commissioners (1897)
168 U. S. 349, 18 Sup. Ct 157.
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are free to decide questions of "commercial and general jurisprudence,"
without adherence to state decisions. Within this concept are questions
concerning contracts not relating to specific property or dependent upon
statutes, 24 commercial paper, 25 agency,
26 negligence,27 insurance,28 car-
riers,29 and conflict of laws.30  The Supreme Court has recently held in
Salem Trust Co. v. The Manufacturer's Finance Co. (1924) 44 Sup.
Ct. 266, that the question whether an earlier assignee of a chose in
action prevails over a later assignee who first notified the debtor is
one of general jurisprudence, to be decided without reference to state
decisions. 31 justices Holmes and Brandeis concurred in the result,
on the ground, however, that the law of the state should govern.
. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is an expression of the jurispruden-
tial conception of a one common law "as a brooding omnipresence in
"Reynwlds v. New York Trust Co. (1911, C. C. A. ist) 188 Fed. 611 (implied
contract on waiver of tort); Bancroft v. Hambly (1899, C. C. A. 9th) 94 Fed. 975
(construction of contract); Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Pierce (191o, C. C. E. D.
Mich.) 183 Fed. 588 (arbitration agreement) ; (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 77.
"5Swift v. Tyson, supra note 6; Taylor & Bournique Co. v. National Bank
(igig, N. D. E. D. Ohio) 262 Fed. 168 (liability of bank as collecting agent) ;
Citirens' Savings Bank v. Newburyport (igog, C. C. A. Ist) I69 Fed. 766
(defenses) ; St. Louis State National Bank v. Cudahy Packing Co. (904,
C. C. W. D. Mo.) 126 Fed. 543, affirmed (904, C. C. A. 8th) 134 Fed. 538
(negotiability). However, state statutes changing the rules of commercial paper
are binding upon the federal courts. Moses v. The National Bank (1893) 149
U. S. 298, 13 Sup. Ct. 9oo; Phipps v. Harding (895, C. C. A. 7th) 7o Fed. 468.
Otherwise if the statute merely declares the common law of the state. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Lane (19o7, E.' D. Ga.) I51 Fed. 276.
'Bragg v. Meyer (1858) Fed. Cas. No. 18oi (powers of agent); Hough v. Ry.
Co. (1879) 100 U. S. 213.
'Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman (19o9, C. C. A. 3d) 169 Fed. i (attractive
nuisance); Hemingway v. Illinois Central R. R. (1902, C. C. A. 5th) 114 Fed.
843 (contributory negligence an affirmative defense) ; Southern Ry. v. Smith (1914,
C. C. A. 6th) 214 Fed. 942 (test of contributory negligence) ; contra: Kowalski v.
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. (i8o8, N. D. Iowa) 84 Fed. 586 (imputed negli-
gence).
Washburn Mfg. Co. v. Reliance Marine Ins. Co. (igoo) 179 U. S. I, 22 Sup.
Ct. i (marine insurance); Meigs v. London Assurance Co. (19o4, C. C. E. D. Pa.)
i26 Fed. 781 (double insurance).
"Lake Shore Ry. v. Prentice (1893) 147 U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261 (initial
carriers' liability).
'Ex Parte Heidelback (1876) Fed. Cas. No. 6, 322; Dygert v. Vermont Loan
Co. (1899, C. C. A. 9th) 94 Fed. 913; see also Guernsey 'v. Imperial Bank (1911,
C. C. A. 8th) I88 Fed. 300. If the substantive rule involved is one of general
jurisprudence, it is obvious that no necessity for determining what law is to govern
arises, since the substantive question is decided by the federal courts without
reference to state decisions. Taylor & Bournique Co. v. National Bank, supra
note 25.
" For a learned discussion of the substantive law involved see COMMENTS (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 767. The Supreme Court refused to follow the English
rule that a later assignee of the same chose who first notifies the debtor is entitled
to priority.
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the sky." 2 It is conceived to be a body of principles adopted by
common law jurisdictions from which its courts can deduce a one
and only proper rule.3 3  True, a court in making the deduction some-
times misstates the rule but the common law remains unchanged in
spite of the error. As Justice Story said, ". . . it will hardly be con-
tended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are at most
only evidence of what the laws are. '3 4  And Justice Gray states that,
"a circuit court . . . . has to inquire what the law of the state may
be . . . it may differ from a state court in determining what the
common law of the state .... applicable to the given case may be." 35
Though this conception is still evinced at times by the courts,36 it is
repudiated by modern analytical jurists.3 7  Thus Justice Holmes says
that "the law of a state does not become something outside of the
state court and independent of it by being called the common law.
Whatever it is called, it is the law as declared by the state judges
and nothing else."3" This point of view is taken in the innumerable
cases in private international law in which the forum accepts as law
the decisions of the courts of a foreign state.
3 9
The dogma that federal tribunals are not bound by state decisions
on questions of general law has long provoked disapprobation. 40  One
supreme court judge has assailed it as an unconstitutional invasion
of state rights.4' Courts sometimes modify it by adhering to a line of
'Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 222,
37 Sup. Ct. 524, 531.
'Blackstone, Commentaries, *70; Zane, German Legal Philosophy (1918) 16
MIcH. L. REv. 287, 337, 345; I Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1916)
132-137.
"Supra note 6, at p. 18.
"Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, supra note 27, at p. I I, 12.
', Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra note 19.
'7 Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (igog) secs. 535-550; I Austin, Juris-
prudence (1869) 37, io4; Holland, Jurisprudence (i2th ed. 1917) 6o, 61; Jethro
Brown, The Austinian Theory of Law (19o6) 311; Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process (1921) 124; Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque
(1895) 8 HARv. L. REv. 328, 329.
'Dissenting in Kun v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra note 19.
'A few sporadic cases, influenced by the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, have deter-
mined the law of the foreign state without reference to thd decisions of its courts.
St. Nicholas Bank'v. State National Baonk (1891) 128 N. Y. 26, 27 N. E. 849;
Roads v. Webb (1898) 91 Me. 406, 4o Atl. I28.
' See Meigs, loc. cit. supra note 2. An attempt to sustain it is made by Schofield,
Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law i, State and Federal
Courts (1910) 4 ILl. L. REv. 533.
" Mr. Justice Field dissenting in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, supra note 13,
at p. 401, 13 Sup. Ct. at p. 927: "I admit that learned judges have fallen into the
habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of
a state in conflict with their views . . . . I have myself in many instances . . .
but I think now erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But notwithstanding
. . . the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a
perpetual protest against its repetition, the constitution of the United States . . ."
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state decisions so numerous that they can be said "to establish a rule
of conduct." 42 And the decisions of the state are frequently given
"considerable weight for the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion
when the question is balanced with doubt. '43 The confusion of the
cases on whether a question relates to "local law" or "general juris-
prudence" contributes much to the uncertainties of law. Perhaps
the most serious objection, however, is that substantive rights are made
to depend upon the chance circumstance of diversity of citizenship.
Thus two choses in action are held against a debtor domiciled in a
state whose courts apply the English doctrine of Dearle v. Hall."
One 6hose is held by a resident creditor who assigns it successively
to two non-resident assignees, A and B. B gives prior notice to the
debtor and is accorded priority by the state courts. The other chose
is held by a non-resident creditor who also successively assigns to A and
B. B gives prior notice to the debtor as before. Here A can sue in the
federal courts45 which -prefer the prior assignee" and B is not, pro-
tected. This is the very inequality of law between residents and non-
residents which Sec. 34 was passed to prevent. The doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson has become so firmly entrenched that a cure will hardly
be effected by judicial legislation. Is it too optimistic to hope for
another and more explicit act of Congress?
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKER AND CUSTOMER
The inadequacy of describing the relationship of banker and deposi-
tor as merely that of debtor and creditor is illustrated by a recent
English case. In Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of
England [1923, C. A.] 40 T. L. R. 214, the defendant bank had informed
the plaintiff's employer that checks payable to the plaintiff had been
indorsed by him to a bookmaker, and intimated that the plaintiff's over-
draft of his account was due to his having engaged heavily in betting.
In a suit for breach of an implied duty not to disclose information
concerning the plaintiff or his account, the lower court instructed the
jury that if the disclosure was made on a reasonable and proper
' Bucher v. Cheshire R. R, supra note ii; Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman,
supra note 27. It has been held that state decisions on a subject of general law
will be followed when the situation is such that a party would otherwise be subject
to double payment of the same debt. Sonstiby v. Keeley (1882, C. C. D. Minn.)
ii Fed. 578.
'Burgess v. Selignan, supra note IO; Presidio County v. Noel-Young Bond Co.
(1909) 212 U. S. 58, 29 Sup. Ct. 237.
" Supra note 31, at p. 769, note 17.
The assignee of a chose cannot sue in the federal courts unless his assignor




occasion, the bank was not liable. In reversing a judgment for the
defendant, the Court of Appeal held that the jury should have been
more definitely instructed as to the nature of the duty owed by the
bank, that there was such a duty implied from the contract,' although
a disclosure for the bank's own needs, or with the consent of the
customer, or in discharge of a legal or public duty, would be legally
privileged. It is remarkable that such an important problem seems
never to have been definitely decided by either the American or English
courts.
2
That the relationship of banker and customer is one which the
courts are astute to protect is illustrated by those cases which hold
that libellous communications by a bank to its customer are condition-
ally privileged.3 The credit structure is strengthened if bankers keep
their customers fully informed about such matters as may affect their
interests. Not only is the bank privileged thus to serve its customer
but it is placed under a duty to pay substantial damages for a wrongful
dishonor of a merchant's check.4 Some courts award substantial
'The pass book provided that "the officers of the bank are bound to secrecy as
regards the affairs of the customers." It seems that the decision would have been
the same even in the absence of this provision. Thus Scrutton, L. J., said, ". . . . I
have no doubt that it is an implied term of a banker's contract with his customer
that the banker shall not disclose the account, or transactions relating thereto, of
his customer except in certain circumstances." 4o T. L. R. at p. 219.
'In Tassell v. Cooper (185o) 9 C. B. 590 this point was raised by counsel, but
was abandoned since he was -Winning on another count. In Foster v. Bank of
London (1862, C. P.) 3 F. & F. 234, the court instructed the jury to find whether
a bank was under such a duty. In Hardy v. Veasey (1868) L. R. 3 Exch. io7, the
court instructed the jury that even if there was such a duty, disclosure on a
reasonable and proper occasion would be privileged. See Grant, Law of Banking
(6th ed. igio) 6; I Morse, Banks and Banking (5th ed. 1917) sec. 294. "It has
never been definitely decided whether the duty of secrecy is a legal one giving
right to at least nominal damages or a moral one only, or an incident of a larger
duty on the part of the banker not to do any act to the prejudice of the customer."
Paget, Law of Banking (3d ed. 1922) 77.
' "On the relation of banker and customer being established, if, by virtue of the
existing relation the baik be entrusted with a cheque for certain purposes, the
occasion of privilege arises, and it is then the bank's duty to notify everything to
the customer which seems to affect his interest." Levy v. Union Bank of Australia
(1896) 21 Vict. L. R. 738; see Lewis v. Chapman (1857) 16 N. Y. 369.
Communications to non-customers-are also privileged if made in answer to a
specific request. Robshaw v. Smith (1878, C. P.) 38 L. T. R- 423; Richardson v.
Gunby (1912) 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533. Similarly where the communication is
made by a mercantile agency. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet (39r4) 25 Idaho,
696, 139 Pac. 0OO7; 12 Ann. Cas. 149, note; ibid. i916 D, 764, note; contra:
Macintosh v. DuAn [i9o8, P. C.] A. C. 390. But the language of the courts where
the communication is made by a bank to a customer is clearly indicative of an
appreciation of the existence of a close relationship.
'Rolin v. Stewart (1854) 14 C. B. 595; Hilton v. Jessup (1907) 128 Ga. 30, 57
S. E. 78; Browning v. Bank of Vernal (i922) 6o Utah, 197, 207 Pac. 462. Where
the depositor is not a merchant, substantial damages are not allowed unless specially
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damages because they regard banks as "quasi-public" institutions.5
Others reach the same result by analogy to slander of a merchant in
his trade.6 In either case the result reflects an appreciation of the
closeness of the relationship and the social advantage of creating cer-
tain special rights and privileges in the parties.
,The classic examples of confidential relationships are those of attor-
ney and client, and physician and patient. There, as with the banker
the relationships are furthered by privileging communications of the
attorney to his client 7 or physician to his patient.6  Furthermore the
attorney or physician is under a duty not to disclose confidential
communications of his client9 or patient.10 The law goes even further
in such cases and requires such communications to be kept secret even as
against the interest of the community in the ascertainment of truth in
court, a greater social advantage being seen in secrecy than in dis-
closure.'
Business cannot to-day be carried on without banks. A customer
makes many confidential statements to his bank for purposes of
borrowing, and any open-eyed banker learns much by merely handling
a checking account. The disclosure of these matters might be highly
injurious to the customer or his credit and invaluable to his competi-
tors. This relationship is equally as important to society as is that of
attorney and client or physician and patient, and confidence is just
as essential to the one as to the others. The court's conversion into
a legal duty of what was certainly a moral duty is commendable.
While Atkins and Bankes, L.JJ., were of the opinion that the bank
was under a duty not to disclose any information concerning its
customers or their accounts that it may have received in its character
proven, there being no presumption of injury to credit. Friedman v. Edgewater
State Bank (1919) 215 Ill. App. 36; First National Bank of Huntsville v. Stewart
(1920) 204 Ala. 199, 85 So. 529. But in New York even if the depositor is a
merchant, substantial damages will be allowed only if the dishonor is wilful.
Meyer v. Hudson Trust Co. (1917, ist Dept.) 181 App. Div. 69, 168 N. Y. Supp.
387; Wildenberger v. Ridgewood National Bank (igzi) 230 N. Y. 425, 13o N. E.
6oo. If substantial damages are granted because of the presumption of injury
to credit, it is difficult to see why the New York courts should require a wilful
dishonor.
'Patterson v. Marine National Bank (1889) 130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. 632.
'Svendsen v. State Bank of Duluth (1896) 64 Minn. 40, 65 N. W. io86; see
(1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194.
'Krue v. Rabe (191o) 8o N. J. L. 378, 380, 79 Atl. 316, 317; Sinions v. Peters-
berger (1917) 181 Iowa, 770, z65 N. W. 91; Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 479, note;
L. R. A. 1918 B, 837, note.
"Brice v. Curtis (1912) 38 App. D. C. 304; 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 69, note.
I Comyns, Digest (5th ed. 1822) 348; Taylor v. Blacklow (1836, C. P.) 3 Bing.
N. Cas. 235.
"Hart v. Therien (1879) 5 Que. L. R. 267; Sinionsen v. Swenson (1920) 104
Neb. 224, 177 N. W. 831; NoTEs (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 312.
" 5 Wigfiore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) secs. 2291, 2380.
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as bank, Scrutton, L.J., thought the duty should extend only to
information received from the account itself. While one hesitates to
dispute Lord Justice Scrutton's view on any subject pertaining to
commercial paper, his limitation of the bank's duty -of non-disclosure
to information received from the account itself seems illogical. It is
difficult to perceive why the disclosure of information received from
a source other than the account should be less damaging than that
received from the account itself. 12
COUNTERCLAIMS UNDER MODERN CODES
The usual provision in the Codes respecting counterclaims is that
which first appeared in the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848.
Section 5o of that statute reads:
"The counterclaim. . . .must tend in some way to diminish the
plaintiff's recovery, and must be one of the following causes of action
against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the person whom he
represents and in favor of the defendant ...
I. A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction, set
forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or
connected with the subject of the action.
2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action on contract,
existing at the commencement of the action."
2
It is under paragraph one that most of the difficulty arises in con-
struing this section, since no attempt was made to define the terms used,
"cause of action," "transaction," and "subject of .the action." These
terms also appear in other parts of the Codes,3 and it seems reasonable
to suppose that the legislatures intended to give them the same mean-
ing in all connections.4
The term "cause of action" has been less troublesome than the
other requirements, though it has been the source of considerable con-
fusion of thought in other connections, 5 especially with respect to
" As pointed out above, the court said that a disclosure would be privileged if
made in discharge of a legal or public duty. If the term "public" is used in the
sense of "legal," it is mere repetition; if in any other sense, the scope of the
exception is so broad as to make the rule extremely flexible.
See Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 19o4) sec. 472, note I, for a collection of
statutes. See also ibid. sec. 602.
2 N. Y. Laws, 1848, ch. 379. This section has been taken over almost literally
into the Civil Practice Act; N. Y. Laws, 192o, ch. 925, sec. 266. There is no
corresponding section in the Connecticut Code; see Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, CIL 294.
But substantially the same rule has been adopted by decision. Downing v. Wilcox
(911) 84 Conn. 437, 8o Atl. 288.
'See for example N. Y. C. C. P. sec. 446 as to joinder of parties plaintiff; sec.
481 as to the contents of the complaint; sec. 484 as to the joinder of causes.
'For an interesting opinion regarding the definition of these terms, see McArthur
v. Moffet (igo) 143 Wis. 564, 574, 128 N. W. 445, 448.
'See (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5o6, as.to when an amendment of a petition
constitutes the statement of a new cause of action. For a discussion of the term
"cause of action," see Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 817.
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joinder of causes,6 and the splitting and consolidation of demands.7
This is largely due to the faith which has been placed in the definition
advanced by Mr. Pomeroy," that "the primary right and duty and the
delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action." This defini-
tion has been subject to criticism,9 which appears to be well-founded.
Thus, it has been pointed out'0 that in this form it would not be
applicable to actions for the partition of land, or for the probate of
a will, where a delict or wrong is not an essential element. Pomeroy's
statement is rather a definition of a right of action, 1 and since it is
recognized that one cause of action may give rise to several rights of
action, 12 it seems more correct to regard as the cause of action the
operative facts out of which a right to relief through the courts arises.'8
The tendency of the courts to permit an amendment during the trial
changing the legal theory of recovery, and therefore changing the
nature, and sometimes the extent, of the remedial right, substantiates
this proposition. 4
In interpreting the other terms in question, it is necessary to keep
in mind that the purpose of the codifiers in expanding the common law
rules as to counterclaims, and permitting the trial of more issues in
one suit than was formerly possible, was to avoid circuity of action.'
The English Judicature Act 6 seems best to accomplish this purpose.
'See Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1920) I8 MicH. L. REv. 57,; COMmENTS
(923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 384.
'See Noms (1923) 9 CORN. L. QUART. 73.
s Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note I, sec. 347: "Every judicial action must therefore
involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a
corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong
done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty;
a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defen-
dant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself .... Of
these elements the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined consti-
tute the cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is used in the
Codes of the several states."
'Phillips, Code Pleading (I896) sec. 3o, note 2.
"Hinton, Cases on Code Pleading (2d ed. 1922) 22, note 4.
" Phillips, loc. cit. supra note 9.
' These terms are clearly not synonymous. Thus, injuries to both person and
property inflicted at the same time, by the majority view, are regarded as consti-
tuting but one cause of action, although more than a single primary right is
involved. Jenkins v. Skelton (1920) 21 Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249; Anderson v.
Jacobson (1919) 42 N. D. 87, 172 N. W. 64; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5o6.
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5o6; (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 326.
" Tinker v. Sater (1922) 1O5 Ohio St. 135, 136 N. E. 854; Raynownd v. Bailey
0 (1922) 98 Conn. 2oi, 118 Atl. 915.
" Phillips, op. cit. supra note 9, sec. 247; (1921) 21 COL. L. Rav. 196.
" (1873) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. Sec. 20 of the Rules of Procedure reads: "A
defendant may set off, or set up, by way of counterclaim against the claims of the
plaintiff, any right or claim, whether such set-off or counterclaim sound in damages
or not, and such set-off or counterclaim shall have the same effect as a statement
of claim in a cross action, so as to enable the court to pronounce a final judgment
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It permits a defendent to counterclaim wherever, in the discretion of
the court, it might be conveniently tried together with the plaintiff's
case. The American Codes do not go to this length, yet it seems
possible, without undue distortion of the words of the statutes, to
reach approximately the same result.
A transaction, as used in the Codes, is not necessarily a series of
negotiations leading to the formation of a contract, nor is it the
actual formation of the contract, though this view formerly had
some support.17  It is clear from the decisions that there need not be
more than one active party to a transaction.ls A transaction has
been held to include in an action for services, the performance of the
services ;1 in an action of replevin, the wrongful taking of the prop-
erty ;20 a trespass to realty; 2" a sale of goods;
22 the conversion of
in the same action, both on the original and on the cross claim. But the Court or
Judge may, on the application of the plaintiff before trial, if in the opinion of the
Court or Judge such counterclaim cannot be conveniently disposed of in the
pending action, or ought not to be allowed, refuse permission to the defendant to
avail himself thereof."
"Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. v. Van Auken (18qi) I Ind. App. 492, 27 N. E.
iig; Barhyte v. Hughes (i861, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 33 Barb. 320. These cases have
in effect been overruled. Excelsior Clay Works v. De Camp (19o7) 40 Ind. App.
26, 8o N. E. 981; Rothschild v. Whitman (1892) 132 N. Y. 472, 30 N. E. 858.
See note 18, infra.
' Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note i, sec. 367 defines a transaction as a "negotiation.
or a proceeding, or a conduct of business, between the parties, of such a nature
that it produces, as necessary results, two or more different primary rights in favor
of the plaintiff, and wrongs done by the defendant which are violations of such
rights." Emerson v. Nash (io5) r24 Wis. 369, 389, 102 N. W. 921, 928: "Any
event in which two or more persons are actors, involving a right which may
presently or by what may proximately occur in respect thereto be violated, creating
a redressible wrong, is a transaction within the meaning of the statute."
McArthur v. Moffet, supra note 4, at p. 572: "At first glance both Pomeroy's
definition and the definition given in the Emerson case might seem to imply that
both parties to the action must be active participants in the event or affair in order
that it constitute a transaction. If this were so, neither a trespass on land in the
absence of the owner, nor an unfounded claim of title to land in like absence, would
amount to a transaction. . . . The definitions referred to do not, when properly
understood, mean that both parties must actually be present in order that an event
or affair may rise to the dignity of a transaction. If the act of one person
wrongfully invades or infringes upon the right of another there is undoubtedly a
transaction, though the injured party be not physically present." See also
Scarborough v. Smith (1877) 18 Kan. 399, 406; Craft Refrigerating Machine
Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co. (1893) 63 Conn. 551, 56o, 29 At. 76, 77; Drincq-
bier v. Wood [1899] i Ch. 393. A number of the authorities are collected in
L. R. A. 1916 !C, 445, 5o4.
"Sheibley v. Dixon County (ioi) 61 Neb. 409, 85 N. W. 399. o
"Osmers v. Furey (9o5) 32 Mont. 581, 8r Pac. 345.
'Sharp v. Kinsan (1882) 18 S. C. io8; Stolze v. Torrison (1903) 118 Wis.
315, 95 N. W. 114.
'Siebrecht v. Siegel-Cooper Co. (1899, 2d Dept.) 38 App. Div. 549, 56 N. Y.
Supp. 425.
COMMENTS
chattels ;23 an arrest.24  The term may be defined as any act or con-
nected series of acts, affecting the legal relations of .two or more per-
sons.
25
Ali equally liberal construction of the term "subject of the action"
may be reached. It has been applied to include the land encroached
on in an action for a trespass to realty ;28 the title to land ;27 a debt ;2s
a mortgage and the property covered by it ;29 chattels ;30 and the like.
3 1
There is some difference of opinion among the text writers as to the
meaning of the term. Pomeroy at one place interprets it as applying
to the physical object involved,3 2 and at another as being the plaintiff's
primary right which has been broken.3 3  The latter, of course, is
open to the same objection as his definition of a cause of action, as
all actions do not include the breach of a right; nor would there in
all cases be a physical object which could properly be called the sub-
ject of the action. 4 By defining the "subject of the action" as the
subject-matter of the action or an interest of the plaintiff in that sub-
ject-matter,3'5 most of the existing authorities would be harmonized,
and the purpose of the Codes could be fulfilled. It is obvious that
the subject-matter need not be tangible property, but may be a chose in
action or a relationship such as marriage.
Admittedly the liberal construction advocated above leaves much
"First National Bank v. Thompson (1913) 41 Okla. 88, 137 Pac. 668.
" Rothschild v. Whitman, supra note 17.
= "As the word is employed in American codes of pleading and in our own
Practice Act, a transaction is something which has taken place whereby a cause
of action has arisen. It must therefore consist of an act or agreement, or several
acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more than
one person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between
themselves are altered." Baldwin, J. in Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnipiac
Brewing Co., supra note I8.
Venable v. Dutch (887) 37 Kan. 515, 15 Pac. 520.
" Grignwn v. Black (89o) 76 Wis. 674, 45 N. W. 122.
"McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Hill (19o4) 3o4 Mo. App. 544, 79
S. W. 745.
"Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Tonawanda Valley R. R. (1887) io6 N. Y. 673, 13
N. E. 937.
20 Carpenter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (1883) 93 N. Y. 552.
" A number of cases are collected in L. R. A. 1916 C, 445, 471, note.
" Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note i, sec. 369.
" Ibid. sec. 651.
34 For example, in an action for divorce, in which the subject of the action
would be the marital relationship, and the interest of the plaintiff in it.
Compare Bliss, Code Pleading (3d ed. 1894) sec. 126: "In an action for a
tort, the injury complained of is the wrong, and the subject of the action would
be that right, interest [relation], or property which has been affected-as, in
replevin or trover, the property taken; for libel or slander, the plaintiff's charac-
ter or occupation; for an injury to a servant, the service; for the seduction of, or
for harboring a wife, the marital relation; for negligence, the duty, property, or
person in respect to which the negligence occurred; for false imprisonment, the
plaintiff's liberty; and for trespass upon property, the property."
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to the discretion of the court in- each case. However, as the Codes
contain no definitions of the terms used, it seems likely that this
result was intended. Furthermore, the allowing or disallowing of a
counterclaim rarely prejudices either party to a suit. If the defendant
has a valid claim, it would be equally valid in an independent action.
So, assuming that the requirement as to parties, and the requirement
that the counterclaim must tend in some way to defeat the plaintiff's
recovery, are satisfied, it is submitted that the controlling factor in
determining the disposition of the counterclaim should be the probable
effect of the counterclaim on the trial of the suit. If it appears that
the issues in the plaintiff's case and in the counterclaim are similar,
and that the same witnesses, for the most part, are required for both
actions, it would expedite the administration of justice to allow the
counterclaim. On the other hand, if it is felt that the counterclaim
will confuse the issues for the jury, or otherwise hamper the action
of the court, it should be denied. In most instances where this would
be true it does not seem that the liberal construction of terms set
out above would prevent this. Sufficient latitude remains by con-
struction of the phrases "arising out of" and "connected with,"38 to
permit rejection. How directly the cause of action must arise out of
the transaction, or how closely it must be connected with the subject
of the action, to be the basis of a counterclaim, might properly be left
to the circumstances of each case.
A recent case illustrates how these principles might be applied. In
Bank of Charleston, National Banking Assoc. v. Bank of Neeses
(1923, S. C.) ii S. E. 841, the plaintiff bank had by mistake credited
the defendant's account with $i,ooo, which amount was later demanded
of the defendant, and payment refused. In the plaintiff's action on
an implied contract to repay the money, the defendant set up three
counterclaims for libel and slander, which, the defendant alleged,
took place two years after the indebtedness arose, and which were
committed because the plaintiff was angry with the defendant for not
paying the indebtedness. The plaintiff demurred to the counterclaim.
Under the interpretations advocated above, the transaction on which
the plaintiff's claim is founded is the act of crediting the defendant's
account. The subject of the action is the asserted quasi-contractual
right and the entire situation concerning it-the aggregate of the opera-
tive facts. There appears to be no logical necessity for deciding that
' "Transaction connected with the same subject of action may include any
transactions which grow out of the subject matter in regard to which the contro-
versy has arisen; as, for instance, the failure of a bailee to use the goods bailed
for the purpose agreed, and also any injury to them by his fault or neglect; the
breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the entry of the lessor, and also a
trespass to goods committed in the course of the entry." Rules of the Superior
Court, sec. 187, CONN. PRACrICE BOOK (1922) 286. This is a rule formulated by
the judges under the rule-making power authorized by Conn. Gen. Sts. i918, ch.
288, sec. 5475.
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the defendant's counterclaims did not arise out of the crediting of the
defendant's account. As the defendant contended, had this not occurred
the plaintiff would not have become angry with the defendant, and would
not have defamed him. This might be a broader application of the
rules of causation than is ordinarily recognized, but there is no necessity
for applying in this connection the same rules of legal cause that are
applied in a tort action for negligence. The lapse of two years does not
of itself break the chain of causation; but the lapse of a considerable
length of time leaves it open for the court to decide that the connection is
too remote and that the defendant's cause of action did not arise out
of the transaction on which the plaintiff's claim, was founded. In
the instant case the court so decided, and sustained the plaintiff's
demurrer to the counterclaims.
Applying the test of convenience of trial, the decision seems sound.
An action for defamation presents different issues from those involved
in a contract action based on an unjust enrichment. A different set
of witnesses, for the most part, might be required for each claim.
These factors in themselves are not conclusive. But actions of defama-
tion frequently result in the award of nominal damages, and
frequently are based largely on wounded sensibilities rather than
actual injury. Being one of the vindictive actions, it is possible
that it would create undue heat and passion which might tend to
hamper a clear presentation of the facts of the plaintiff's case to the
jury. These practical considerations might well have formed the
basis of the court's decision in denying the counterclaims.
COLLISIONS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Does the nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction or do the rules of interna-
tional law require a court in determining liability for collisions in
foreign territorial waters to vary the usual rule of the conflict of laws
as to tort obligations?1 A recent Scottish case, Owners of S. S.
"Reresby" v. Owners of S. S. "'Cobetas" (Outer House) 1923, Scots
L. T. 719, answered this question in the affirmative. A Spanish ship
collided with an English ship in French territorial waters. The owners
of the latter sued the owners of the former in a Scottish court. The
defendants pleaded that the law of the locus delicti should govern
and that by this law they were discharged from liability because their
ship was sunk in the collision. The court held that the law of the
forum applied and dismissed the plea.
The court found it necessary to hold that "the locus commissi here is
'The usual rule that in tort cases the law of the locus delicti governs, has a
peculiar variation in England. The English courts will not give relief for an
alleged foreign tort unless the act was wrongful by the law of the locus, and
would, if committed in England, be a tort by English law. See Dicey, Conftict of
Laws (i896) 659.
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part of the high seas, although within the territorial waters of France."
2
The court said that had the accident occurred intra fauces terrae, or
within "the land territory of France" where the French state would
have exclusive jurisdiction, the French law would be applied. But this
jurisdictional difficulty does not in fact exist. The court seems to be
confused, as courts frequently are, by the different uses of the word
"jurisdiqtion." In the first place, there is what we may call "local
court jurisdiction," which is a'question determined by the local law as
to what court-admiralty, probate, appellate, equity-the government
has authorized to handle a certain part of the judicial business. In the
second place there is what may properly be called "territorial jurisdic-
tion" which, it is submitted, is determined by international law. By
virtue of this "jurisdiciton" a state has the exclusive legal privilege of
acting through its agents upon persons and property while they are
within its territorial limits, and a right that no other state shall so act.
For example, the officers of State X alone may rightfully serve A with
process in the territory of that state, though it is true that the officers of
State Y by wrongfully serving A in X's territory, have the power to
affect his legal relations before Y's courts. Under this head we may
also class the phenomenon which has grown up possibly more as a
matter of convenience than of law, that a state may lay down rules
according to which persons while within its territory will normally
govern their conduct. This does not mean that a foreign court may
not also attach similar or different legal consequences to such conduct.
And thirdly, there is jurisdiction which involves elements of the other
two and which upon analysis seems to be that to which courts (albeit
usually unconsciously) have reference in cases involving the conflict of
laws. It is this "conflicts jurisdiction" which is here under discussion.
In this sense jurisdiction is merely a question whether a particular.
court has power to attach legal consequences to certain operative facts.
Given the power, the determination of what consequences will be
attached is a matter of convenience and policy. Whether the Scottish
court had "jurisdiction" is merely a question whether it had the power
to affect the legal relations of the parties litigant. Any legal limitations
upon such a power "must be found in positive law of some kind-be
the same international law or constitutional law, and do not inhere in
the constitution of the legal universe." 3  The term "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" implies some such inherent necessity for any forum which may
'At p. 721.
'Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YAL
LAW JOURNAL, 457, 484. Professor Cook analyzes the orthodox view of juris-
diction which considers that there is only one appropriate or proper law which
can attach legal consequences to a given situation. There might be another bar
of "self-limitation" as when a court having originally had a choice decides not to
take jurisdiction thereby binding courts in the future on the basis of stare decisis.
Here we may place certain well-settled rules of the conflict of laws which have
come to be a part of our legal system.
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be seised of the case to attach consequences according to the law of the
locus. The territorialist school pictures some such natural necessity.
There was in the case under consideration no constitutional bar (if we
may use the term in a broad sense to denote internal as distinguished
from international control). An English4 statute of 18615 provides
that "The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any
claim for damage done by any ship." Dr. Lushington, the noted
English Admiralty judge, in interpreting this statute fixed a realm of
admiralty jurisdiction which has no territorial limits.6 In the leading
case, The Diana,7 he asserted the court's jurisdiction over a collision in
the Great North Holland Canal, a body of water geographically well
within the territory of Holland. That the owners of both vessels were
foreigners made no difference.8 This position is in accord with the
general maritime practice of the world. It is natural that a branch of
the law which centers around ships which are here to-day and there
to-morrow, should find little difficulty in vesting power in the courts
of any state within whose territory the ship may be found, especially
since the procedure is in rem. Nor does international law forbid the
exercise of such power. The high seas are common ground and the
fiction of the territoriality of vessels has never been extended to grant
exclusively to the state of the flag the power to pass upon collisions at
sea which are said to be communis juris.9 In territorial waters, inter-
national law recognizes two spheres: first, what we may call the
marginal sea proper, through which the ships of all nations have a right
of innocent passage, subject to the control of the littoral state only in so
far as the interests of that state may be affected by the actions of the
ship or of those on board. The littoral state may impose rules of navi-
gation and the like; that is, it has "territorial jurisdiction" but no
claim to "exclusive jurisdiction" in the conflicts sense may be asserted.
Second, inland waters, or waters intra fauces terrae, including ports and
harbors where the littoral state exercises a larger but not exclusive
control.10 There is then no necessity for the assumption that the locus
'The Admiralty law of Sr-otland is the same as that of England. See the deci-
sion in the instant case in 1923, Scots L. T. 492, 493; Roscoe, Measure of Dainages
in Maritime Collisions (2d ed. 1920) 133.
:24 Vict. c. io, sec. 7.
See Marsden, Collisions at Sea (7th ed. i919) 220.
'(1862, Adm.) i Lush. 539.
" The Courier (1862, Adm.) i Lush. 541. The Ida (i86o, Adm.) i Lush. 6,
contains a few statements which might be construed as contra to The Diana, but
jurisdiction was refused in that case not because of the loc=s, but because the
nature of the act did not give rise to a maritime cause of action.
'See The Belgenland (1885) 114 U. S. 355, 367, 369, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o, 865, 866.
"To discuss the varied views which have been expressed on the nature of the
marginal sea, is beyond the scope of this comment. Most general works on inter-
national law touch on this problem. See i Moore, Digest of International Law
(i9o6) sec. 144; 2 ibid. sec. 2o3; Hall, International Law (7th ed. 1917) 155; I
YALE LAW JOURNAL
delicti in the instant case was on the high seas, and furthermore, it is
unjustified as a principle of international law.
1
Assuming then that the court may determine the legal consequences
of a collision in foreign territorial waters, what rule of law is it to
apply ?12 For convenience we may discuss the problem under three
heads: Navigation, Compulsory Pilotage, and the Liability of the
Shipowner. The first two cover the determination of the fact of negli-
gence or fault, and the third refers to the question of how the penalty
shall be borne when the blame has been placed.
1 3
The power of the state under international law to lay down rules for
navigation of foreign ships within territorial waters has been noted.
Just as an automobilist in France must keep to the right, so it seems
natural that a ship in French waters must obey the rules of the sea-
road.14  This is the general view of the English courts which have
applied local rules of harbors, rivers, and other foreign waters.
5  In
Westlake, International Law (1904) i89. Among special works, see Latour,
La Mer Territoriale (1889); Raestad, La Mer Territoriale (1913); Crocker,
The Extent of the Marginal Sea (IgI); cf. COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 72.
'The court (at p. 721) shows some realization of this point. See Lorenzen,
Cases on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1924) 282, note 30, for a statement of
American, continental, and South American law.
"Professor Cook in his article op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 468, discusses the real
meaning of "applying foreign law." In the instant discussion "foreign law" is
used to mean the foreign domestic rule only.
" Whether A is liable for the act of B, or whether A when liable can limit his
liability, appears clearly to be a matter of substance and not of procedure; the
extent of rights and duties and their very nature are involved.
" It is perhaps well to note in this connection the language of the court in The
Halley (i868) 5 Moore P. C. (i-. s.) 262, 276: "As in the case of a collision on
an ordinary road in a Foreign country, where the rule of the road in force at the
place of collision may be a necessary ingredient in the determination of the question
by whose fault or negligence the alleged tort was committed. But in these and
similar cases the English Court admits the proof of the Foreign law as part of the
circumstances attending the execution of the contract, or as one of the facts upon
which the existence of the tort, or the right to damages, may depend, and it then
applies and enforces its own law so far as it is applicable to the case thus estab-
lished; but it is .... alike contrary to principle and to authority to hold, that an
English Court of Justice will enforce a Foreign Municipal Law, and will give a
remedy in the shape of damages in respect of an act which, according to its own
principles, imposes no liability on the person from whom the damages are claimed."
Yet the court will withhold damages in respect of an act which according to
English law does impose liability on the person from whom the damages are
claimed, if the foreign law give no such remedy. The M. Moxham (1875) L. R.
i P. Div. 43.
" Tle Calvin Aitstin (i9o4, New Brunswick Admn. Dist.) 9 Exch. Ct. i6o
(Boston Harbor rules); The Diana (1894, P. C.) L. R. ig A. C. 625; T1he
Yourri (1885, P. C.1 L. R. io A. C. 276 (DInube River rules); The Talabot
(i8go) 15 P. 194 (customary rule in the Scheldt) ; contra: The City of Berlin
[igo8, C. A.] P. I1O (Elbe river rules not inquired into by court); see The Kaiser
Wilhelm der Grosse [19o7. C. A.] P. 259 (Cherbourg Harbor rules). In two
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American courts, the exact question has not often been raised, but it
seems that the local rule would be applied. 16 On principle, English
rules of navigation should equally apply to foreign ships in British
waters and the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act of 186217 so
provided. It seems that local English rules for river traffic should be
enforced against foreign ships,18 but the English courts were reluctant
to admit this. 9 It has been said that foreign municipal regulations
for the navigation of harbors and rivers have not the force of law in
the English court but are important in determining liability for colli-
sion in foreign waters.20 It is true that the English court will adminis-
ter only English law (which includes the English interpretation of the
general maritime law) but the court seems to admit that it is negligence
not to obey a foreign local regulation for navigation.21 Thus indirectly
the foreign rule is given effect in England. We can therefore say
that if in the X River a local regulation requires an ascending vessel
to give way to a descending vessel, this regulation is accepted as part of
the law of England, by which we mean that we can prophesy that if an
ascending ship does not give way and a collision results, that ship must
answer to the descending ship in damages, the payment of which will
be enforced by the officers of the English court who will detain the ship
as security if she visits an English port.22 In these cases it seems the
English courts do not insist on finding a general rule of the forum
which would make the particular act a tort.
In British courts the difficulty in pilotage cases arose from the fact
that until 1918,23 )by the English law, compulsory pilotage was a good
cases Dr. Lushington held that the general maritime law applied to collisions in
Turkish waters. The Griefswaid (1859, Adm.) Swabey, 43o; The Ticonderoga
(1857, Adm.) Swabey, 215.
" See The New York (1899) I75 U. S. 187, I99; 2o Sup. Ct. 67, 71; Southern
Ry. v. United States (i91o) 45 Ct of Claims, 322, 336; Hughes, Admiralty
(190) 215; but see The Eagle (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. I5, 21; The Avon (1873,
C. C. N. D. Ohio) Fed. Cas. No. 68o.
27 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, sec. 57; see Marsden, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 219; Cf.
The Vera Cruz (1884, C. A.) L. R. 9 P. Div. 96. Before the passage of that act,
the cases were divided although the higher courts took the view which was later
sanctioned by Parliament. See The Borussia (1856, Adm.) Swabey, 94, 95; The
Milford (1858, Adm.) Swabey, 362, 367; General Iron. Screw Collier Co. v.
Schurnianns (i86o, Ch.) i John. & Hem. 18o, igI; The Saxonia (1861, P. C.)
I5 Moore, P. C. 262, 267; see Lowndes, Collisions at Sea (1867) 183.
18 See Marsden, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 227.
The Fyenoord (I858, P. C.) Swabey, 374; cf. The Saxonia, supra note 17, at
p. 267; see Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 17, at p. 184.
" See Marsden, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 227; Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 17,
at p. 187, and case there cited.
' The Diana, supra note 15.
2 2See Cook, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 476.
' The Pilotage Act of 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 31, sec. 15, changed the English
law by abolishing the defense of compulsory pilotage. By par. 2 of this section
it was provided that the section should not take effect until 1918. See Digby and
Cole, Pilotage Law (1913) 23.
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defense in a collision suit, because the pilot who was in full control of
the ship was not an agent chosen by the party, and therefore the doctrine
of respondeat superior could not apply.24 But by the continental prac-
tice, the compulsory pilot had merely an advisory capacity and his
presence on board did not relieve the ship from liability for a collision.
2 5
Should the English court then say that facts of collision + compulsory
pilotage = non-liability, or should it examine the nature of the second
term under the local law? In The Halley,26 the Privy Council held that
when the pilot was compulsory, there would not be any liability in an
English court, although the law of the locus, Belgium, made the ship
responsible. The true nature of the pilot's function in Belgian law was
apparently not properly presented by counsel, and the court considered
that the pilot was in full control.2 7  The Court of Appeal in a later
case took a sounder view,8 probably based on more complete informa-
tion as to the foreign law, saying: "With the law of France we are
not concerned. We are concerned with the law of England, and in an
English case we are bound by the law of France because the law of
France establishes what are the circumstances of the appointment and
employment of the pilot. When you find that the pilotage is such that
it comes under one head of the English law rather than another, you
adopt the terms of the employment according to the English law."
29
They found that the law of France did not put the pilot in full control
and that therefore there was no compulsory pilotage in the English sense,
and the ship was liable. In almost every other English case the court has
looked at the local pilotage laws to ascertain whether or not the pilot
did actually control the ship.30 It is obvious that if there was no such
control there was no reason for applying the English rule. In The
Andoni,'31 the court said that compulsory pilotage prima facie meant
that the pilot was in control and that the plaintiff had the burden of
showing he was merely an advisor. This is probably nothing more
" See The Halley, sapra note i4, at p. 274.
"See Digby and Cole, op. cit. supra note 23, at p. 86. The American rule is
like the continental. See Hughes, supra note 16, at p. 34.
"Supra note 14.
" In The Augutsta (1887, C. A.) 6 Asp. M. C. 161, I6z, The Halley was explained
on the assumption that the Belgian or Dutch law did not make the pilot merely
advisory. That this view was erroneous, see (19o4) 76 Pandectes Belges, 771;
art. 31 of the Reglement of May 20, 1843. At p. 795, par. No. 14, the author of
the Pandectes says, "Le pilote n'est que le conseiller du capitaine et la legislation
belge n'enl~ve jamais au capitaine, nri la direction, ni la responsabilit6 de son
navire." See Roscoe, Admiralty Practice (3d ed. 19o3) i8o, note (a).
"The Augusta, supra note 27.
"Ibid., 163.
" The Guy Mannering (1882, C. A.) L. R. 7 P. Div. 132; The Dallington [1903]
P. 77 (Belgian law); The Prins He drik [1899] P. 177 (Dutch law) ; The Agnes
Otto (1887) L. R. 12 P. Div. 56 (International Danube regulations); The Peer-
less (i86o, Adm.) i Lush. 30 (British colonial law).
[1918] P. 14.
COMMENTS
than a way of stating the rule that the foreign law must be proved. But
if before 191832 the foreign law had provided that though the pilot was
merely advisory the ship was relieved from liability, or if at the present
time a foreign state granted freedom from liability when the pilot was
in absolute control, there would in both cases be sufficient facts to create
liability under the English law, but there would be no wrongful act in
the locus delicti. Under the peculiar English doctrine of the conflict of
laws requiring the act to be a wrong both by the English law and by the
law of the locus, a'recovery would be denied in both cases.3 3 The same
result would be reached under the general rule applying the locus delicti.
Practically, such a solution is sound. A ship captain can regulate his
conduct according to the law of the country through whose waters he
chances to be passing, but it is obviously impossible for him to adjust
himself to the rules of any and all forums before which his ship might
be haled.34  The Supreme Court of the United States did not hesitate
to apply the English statute making compulsory pilotage a defense, to a
collision occurring in the port of Liverpool."
With regard to shipowners' liability, this may be of two kinds.
Where the proceeding is in rem, the owner is liable to the extent of the
value of the ship, a result which is conveniently, but from the analytical
viewpoint inaccurately, described by the personality theory which says
the ship itself is liable. Where the proceeding is in personam, the
owner may be liable, as in the instant case, though his ship is at the
bottom of the sea. 'It is this latter sort of liability with which we are
here concerned. An interesting case is that of The M. Moxham.3"
An English company sued the owners of an English ship for damage
done by that ship to the company's dock in Spain. The defendants
pleaded that the Spanish law, which does not recognize the doctrine of
respondeat superior, should govern. The court said that the plaintiff
properly conceded that the question must be treated exactly in the same
way as if it were being tried in Spain, and, if he would win his suit, he
must show that it would be the duty of the Spanish Court, if the action
'It was in that year the Pilotage Act took effect; see supra note 23.
"But see statement of Sir Robert Phillimore in The Halley (1867, Adm.) L. R.
2 Adm. & Ec. 3, 13, that pilotage is considered a matter of policy.
"The tendency is to unify the rules of the sea by international convention. The
question of collisions at sea was discussed at the International Maritime Commit-
tee's Conference of Brussels (1897), Antwerp (i898), London (1899), Paris
(igoo), Hamburg (1go2), and at the diplomatic conferences held in Brussels in
19o5, i9og, and 1gio. In 191o an international convention on Collision and Salvage
was signed, which has been ratified by most of the important nations of the world.
The United States ratified as to salvage only. See International Maritime Com-
mittee Bulletin No. 47 (1921) 2. The Antwerp Conference of 1921 passed a
resolution urging other states to adhere at once. Ibid. XI. The text of the con-
vention is given in Marsden, op. cit* supra, note 6, at p. 550.
" Smith v. Condry (1843, U. S.) i How. 28.
"Supra note 14.
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had proceeded there, to apply the principles of English law.
7  The
court argued that by entering a Spanish harbor, the ship made herself
subject to Spanish law, which therefore governs this case and makes it
impossible for the plaintiff to place on the defendant a liability not
recognized by that law. The court thus commits the error of assuming
that because Spain had "territorial jurisdiction" she also necessarily
had exclusive "conflicts jurisdiction." In a later case
3" the House of
Lords held that an act in foreign territorial waters which was legalized
by a local ordinance was not actionable though a tort under English law.
Marsden states that if a collision occurs in foreign territorial waters
where the local law does not make the owners liable for the acts of the
officers and crew, the owners will not be held liable in England.
3 9 But
he also states40 that if two foreign ships collide in foreign waters, the
English Admiralty rule for the division of loss will be applied though
it is not part of the general maritime law. The two statements cannot
be based on the same principle. The confusion is intensified by the
instant case wherein the defendant is refused the benefit of a defense
afforded by the rules of the locus.
It seems that the English courts are trying to follow a policy which
"limits the creation of rights in case of foreign torts to those which are
if not identical with, at least highly similar to, the rights created by the
foreign law where the torts were committed."
4' 1 The tendency to-day is
to unify the rules of the sea by International Convention.
42  The
English legislature has taken some steps to iron out the difficulties,
and the courts are apparently willing to take a hand in the movement.
But where divergencies still exist, the court should apply the law of the
locus. As pointed out above, it is only by this law that the captain can
reasonably be expected to govern his conduct. The soundness of this
reason as applied to general rules of navigation is believed to be obvious.
In the pilotage cases the same practical considerations are present. A
pilot will naturally govern his conduct by the law under which he lives
and by force of which he is taken aboard the ship. Presumably the
captain is familiar with that law. If under such law the pilot is
advisory only and the captain is still responsible for the negligent hand-
ling of the vessel, the latter will be zealous in assisting the pilot and in
commanding the ship. If, on the other hand, he knows that the local
'" This is the renvoi doctrine which cannot be discussed here but which seems to
be an undesirable rule for the conflict of laws. See Lorenzen, The Renvoi
Doctrine i; the Conflict of Laws (I918) 27 Y~m.z LA w JouaxAL, 509; The
Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law (igio) io CoL,. L. REv. i9o,
327.
2 Carr v. Fracis Tines & Co. [i9O, H. L.] A. C. 176.
'At p. 225.
"At pp. I42 and 224, esp. note (i) p. 142.
4' See Cook, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 48o.
"See supra note 34.
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law puts the pilot in full control and relieves him from liability, his
relations with the pilot will be governed accordingly. This reasoning
does not apply to our third group of cases (Shipowner's Liability).
The limitation of a shipowner's liability is a matter of policy based upon
a desire to encourage investments in shipping. It protects the owner of
a negligent vessel which is sunk; the owner of the injured vessel can
find protection in insurance. Therefore in any given case the court
may well as to this personal liability as distinguished from the "liability
of the vessel" apply either the rule of the forum or the rule of the
locus as its local policy dictates. In the absence of a conflicting policy,.
the interests of uniformity will best be served by applying the rule of
the locus.4 3
'For a discussion of the relative merits of applying the law of the locu,, the
forum, or of the flag of either ship, see Cholet, L'VAbordage (1898) II6. This
author prefers to apply the law of the flag of the colliding ship. See also (1888-9)
IO ANNUAIRE DE -'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 152; Regnaud, Droit
Franjais des Abordages Maritimes (18gi) 284.
